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Abstract 
Greenhouse gas emission inequalities between and within five income groups of 
countries are computed. The revealed dominant emission inequality between the high 
income groups and the low and middle income groups and its likely intensification by 
an internationally uniform abatement rate constitute a case for using per capita figures 
in analyzing countries’ unilateral and internationally cooperative emission 
abatements. The analysis suggests that the cooperative expected net benefit 
maximizing emission abatement can be smaller than the unilateral abatement for weak 
countries and also for lower and upper middle income economies with high ability 
and inclination to politically and economically reward other countries. 
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In the absence of a binding international agreement, a rationally managed country 
unilaterally abates greenhouse gas emissions at a level that maximizes her expected 
net benefit. In addition to a cleaner and healthier domestic environment and a slower 
process of global warming, a country’s benefit from self emission reduction may 
include improved image and, in turn, bilateral economic and political relations. We 
argue that the evaluation of countries’ emission abatements should be on a per capita 
basis. We then demonstrate that if other countries’ assessments of, and reactions to, a 
country’s commitment to per capita emission abatement are influenced by relative per 
capita output and its traded component, the optimal cooperative per capita abatement 
can be smaller than the unilaterally optimal one for some countries. 
     Studies of international greenhouse gas emissions have considered the effect of 
international economic relations – trade, in particular. For example, Barrett (1997) has 
studied the role of trade sanctions in deterring free riding. Using a general equilibrium 
model with a game theoretic component, Alpay (2000) has shown under which 
conditions trade can stimulate environmental protection. Eyckmans and Tulkens 
(2003) have introduced a world model for simulating cooperative game theoretic 
aspects of global climate negotiations. Kemfert, Lise and Tol (2004) have focused on 
how international trade changes optimal emission reduction and incentives to 
cooperate on emission reduction. Their modelling of a country’s cost of emission 
reduction has attempted to capture the domestic costs of self emission reduction, the 
effect of international variation in the level of stringency of emission reduction policy 
on the country’s terms of trade and capital flow, and the negative external effect on 
the country’s export of a slowing international economic growth that is due to foreign 
emission reduction. The models used in these studies focus on aggregate levels of 
domestic and foreign emissions and some of their assumptions hold only if countries 
are identical.1 
     Countries differ in population size and growth rate and in stage of economic 
development. Although lower middle income countries such as China and, to a lesser 
extent, India contributed 23.47% and 4.93% of the global carbon-dioxide emissions in 
2004, the per capita emissions of these most populous countries and major 
                                                 
1 For instance, in Kemfert, Lise and Tol (2004) there is no external cost effect on a country via the 
terms of trade and international capital dynamics when all the countries abate the same level of 
emissions (using their notations, 0)( =− jii RRg  when ji RR = ).  
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manufacturing workshops of highly affordable, tradable goods were 19% and 6%, 
respectively, of those of high income countries such as Canada and the United States. 
These differences and inequities are not captured by models focusing on countries’ 
aggregate levels of emissions.  
     To better motivate the use of per capita figures in evaluating countries’ greenhouse 
gas emission abatement, section 2 investigates, in a manner that takes into account 
population shares, the contributions of emission disparities between and within 
income groups of countries to the international emission inequality since 1990 – the 
post Cold War and transition period to global market economy. The investigation 
reveals a stable dominance of inequality between the income groups over the 
inequality within these groups during the fifteen-year period for which data are 
available.2 Section 3 highlights the possible intensification of the emission inequality 
between the income groups of countries under an internationally uniform abatement 
rate of countries’ initial aggregate emissions.  
     Greenhouse gas emissions are byproducts of production and consumption 
activities. From a global welfare perspective, an intensification of the already large 
international per capita emission disparities is not desirable. Therefore, we formulate 
countries’ emission abatements on a per capita basis and within a framework that 
allows for non-uniform abatement rates. A country’s costs and benefits of abatement 
are formulated in section 4 in a way that highlights the possible effects of the 
country’s and her counterparts’ per capita emissions, incomes and domestically 
consumed output. In particular, the assessment of, and reaction to, a country’s 
commitment to emission abatement by other countries are considered to be influenced 
by per capita income and traded and non-traded output composition. A higher degree 
of tolerance is assumed to be revealed toward a low income country with a large share 
of tradable output than to a high income country with a small share of tradable output. 
In sections 5 and 6 this influence is incorporated into the determination of the 
internationally cooperative and unilateral emission reductions. The analysis proposes 
that under such an influence the unilateral emission abatements of large, open, lower 
and upper middle income economies might exceed their optimal internationally 
                                                 
2 This result is in agreement with Dunlap, Gallup and Gallup’s (1993) finding that nine out of the 
fourteen items in the Health of the Planet Survey that measure environmental concern are negatively 
correlated with GNP per capita. It is also in agreement with Franzen’s (2003) finding that the increase 
in real per capita income between 1993 and 2000 did not lead to a further increase in the environmental 
concern of the residents in wealthier nations who participated in the 1993 and 2003 International Social 
Survey Programs. 
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cooperative abatements. Section 7 computes and discusses the Cournot equilibrium 






2. International emission inequality and its decomposition by income
Let  be the annual emissions of country i affiliated to income group k,  the 
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/k kp P P=  the population 
share of income group k in the global population, /ik wq Q Qik =  the emission share of 
country i affiliated to income group k in the global emissions, and / wik ikp P= P  the 
population share of country i affiliated to income group k in the global population. 
Following Fishlow’s (1972) earliest application and Bourguignon’s (1979) evaluation, 
our computation of the international emission inequality employs a decomposition 
formula of Theil’s (1967) entropy coefficient which is differentiable, symmetric, 
homogeneous of degree zero, preserving the total emission inequality between the 
individual countries and measuring the contributions of their income groups:  
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.  (1) 
The first term on the right-hand side measures the emission inequality between the 
income groups and the second, the emission inequality within these groups.3  
     Using the World Bank’s classification, countries are sorted into low income, lower 
middle income, upper middle income, high income/nonOECD and high 
 
3 The equality of this decomposition to Theil’s index of international emission inequality is proven as 
follows: 
1
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income/OECD groups (see Appendix A). Table 1 summarizes our computations of the 
international emission inequality index and decomposition between and within the 
said income groups with the United Nations’ data on 185 countries’ carbon-dioxide 
emissions and populations in 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2004.4  
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4 Annual figures on carbon-dioxide emissions and populations are extracted from the Millennium 
Development Goals Database, and from the UNSD Demographic Statistics, United Nations Statistics 
Division. 
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     The largest contributor to the international emission inequality has been the high 
income/OECD group. Its contribution has been about eight times that of the second 
largest contributor – the high income/nonOECD group. Despite having the largest 
internal emission inequality, the lower middle income group has had, as in the case of 
the low income group, an overall moderating effect on the international emission 
inequality due to a dominant negative contribution to inequality between groups. Yet, 
the aggregate contribution of inequality between the five income groups to the 
international emission inequality has been about twice as large as the contribution of 
the inequality within these groups during the entire observed period. This result is 
attributed to the very large contribution of the high income/OECD group to the 
emission inequality between groups, while modestly contributing to emission 
inequality within groups, and to the low emission inequalities within the other income 
groups.  
     Furthermore, the emission share of the high income/OECD group has been about 
three times this group’s population share. In contrast, the emission share of the low 
income group has declined from 0.2 to 0.146 of its population share, and the emission 
share of the lower middle income group, to which more than half of the world’s 
population and the largest workshop economies – China and India – are affiliated, has 
only risen from less than 0.5 of its population share to about 0.6 over the observed 
period. Although the per capita emissions of the high income/OECD group have been 
the highest and steadily risen, they declined from about seven times the per capita 
emissions of the most populous group of lower middle income countries in 1990 to 
five times in 2004.   
 
3. Inequitability of a uniform abatement rate of countries’ aggregate emissions  
Greenhouse gas emissions are byproducts of production and consumption activities. 
As can be seen from Table 1, affluence is indeed positively correlated with per capita 
emissions and the recorded emission inequality and per capita disparity between the 
five income groups of countries are already large. Moreover, it is possible that the 
poorer the country the higher her full marginal mitigation and adaptation costs of 
emission reduction. In comparison to rich countries, production and consumption 
activities in poor countries are more painfully forgone. In addition, the rich countries’ 
technological and innovative edge moderates their production and consumption loss. 
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Hence, an intensification of the international per capita emission disparities is not 
desirable from a global welfare perspective. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: If the rate of population growth is negatively correlated with 
affluence, then the poor countries’ rates of abatement of per capita emissions are 
larger than those of rich countries under a uniform abatement rate of countries’ 
initial aggregate emissions.  
 
Proof: Under a uniform abatement rate ( 0 1α< < ) of countries’ initial aggregate 
emissions { }, the rate of abatement of per capita emissions for a country i 

























     As can be seen from Table 1, during the observed period 1990-2004 the population 
shares of the two high income groups have steadily declined, most profoundly in the 
case of the high income/OECD group. In contrast, the population share of the low 
income group has steadily risen. The population share of the lower middle income 
group has slightly risen and the population share of the upper middle income group 
has slightly declined. These findings reveal that the population growth rate of the low 
income group has been the highest and followed, in order, by those of the lower 
middle income group, upper middle income group, high income/nonOECD group and 
high income/OECD group.  
     The hypothesis of a negative correlation between population growth rate and 
affluence is further assessed by regressing the 185 countries’ population growth rate 
over the period 1990-2004 onto their 1990’s per capita gross domestic product 
( ). As can be seen from the following estimated form (t-ratios computed 
with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and reported in parentheses), 
the ordinary least squares estimation results indicate that this hypothesis is not 





ˆ 0.106575 0.00000261i ig P− = − CGDP          (2) 
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     In view of the estimated negative correlation between population growth rate and 
income and Proposition 1, it is expected that an application of a uniform abatement 
rate of countries’ initial aggregate emissions intensifies the per capita emission 
disparity and the associated consumption gap between the rich and poor countries. 
This expectation lends support to the consideration of a non-uniform rate of per capita 
emission abatement in formulating international abatement schemes. This aspect is 
featured in our formulation of the costs and expected benefits of countries’ emission 
abatements and, subsequently, in the derived internationally cooperative and, for 
comparison, unilateral expected net benefit maximizing abatements. 
 
4. Country’s costs and benefits of abatement 
Country i’s total cost of reducing its per capita greenhouse gas emissions from the 
present level  to  includes the full costs (including production loss) of 
enforcement of, and adaptation to, the new lower domestic emission level. We assume 
that these mitigation and adaptation costs (MAC) convexly rise with the country’s 
aggregate level of emission abatement:  
îe ie
2ˆ[( ) ]i i i i iMAC c e e P= −          (3) 
where  denotes country i’s population and  is a positive scalar indicating the 
gradient of country i’s marginal MAC. We further assume that the marginal MAC’s 
gradient declines from a maximal value  with the country’s level of economic 
development as some production and consumption activities are less painfully forgone 
and as technological absorptive and innovative capacities are improved. Taking the 
pre abatement per capita income (
iP ic
0c >
1y ≥ ) as an indicator of the country’s level of 
economic development, we let  be given by: ic
/ic c y= i
i
.          (4) 
   A reduction of domestic emissions increases the residential value of country i. Due 
to trans-boundary externalities, this appreciation of domestic residence ( ) also 
depends on the emissions abated by other countries. We take  to be linear (for 
tractability) in country i’s emission abatement, 
iADR
iADR
ˆ( )i ie e P− , and in each of her j 
( ) counterpart’s emissions abatement, (Nij ,...,3,2,1=≠ ˆ )j je e jP− . The average 
external effect of any country j’s emission abatement on  depends on the 
directional alignment of i and j with dominant winds, on the distance between i and j 
iADR
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and on the structure of the surface separating i from j. Due to these intervening 
factors, the average external effect ( 0jiβ ≥ ) is likely to be smaller than the average 
internal effect ( 0iα > ) of i’s emission abatement. With 
exp
je  denoting country i’s 
expectations about any country j’s per capita emissions, country i’s expected 
appreciation of domestic residence is: 











+∑( )i ie e Pα= −
( ie e= −
j
⎥
.      (5) 
    By reducing her emissions, country i also contributes to the aggregate international 
effort of moderating the global accumulation of greenhouse gases and, in turn, global 
warming. We take country i’s expected benefit (in nominal units) from the aggregate 
international effort to moderate global warming (MGW) to be given by: 
ˆ( ) ) (
N
i i i i j j
j i
E MGW P eγ
≠
+⎢ ∑       (6) 
where iγ  is a positive scalar indicating a fixed (for tractability) marginal benefit to 
country i from the aggregate effort to moderate global warming.   
     As other countries’ environment and terms of trade depend on country i’s 
commitment to emission reduction, there are international benefits to country i from 
impressing her counterparts of being environmentally responsible and non-
opportunistic trading partner. However, country i cannot equally impress all her 
counterparts. A less committed country may regard country i as environmentally 
responsible and a non-opportunistic trading partner, whereas a more committed 
country might deem country i environmentally irresponsible and an opportunistic 
trading partner. Hence, country i may economically and politically be rewarded by the 
former, but sanctioned by the latter. As a higher degree of tolerance is likely to be 
revealed toward a low income country producing tradable goods, the sanctions and 
rewards might be responsive to the portion of the per capita income generated by 
export oriented industries. We therefore assume that country i expects her economic 
and political relations with any other country to change with the relative stringency of 
their emission-abatement policies devaluated by their non-export income. More 
specifically, we assume that country i expects the loss of bilateral relations (LBR) with 
country j to diminish from a maximal nominal level  with her ratio of per 
capita abatement to per capita non-export income, relative to that of country j. The 
max 0≥jiLBR
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maximal loss depends on the nature of the initial bilateral relations, relative size and 
international influence of i and j. Consequently, country i’s expected aggregate loss of 
international relations (LIR) is: 
max
exp
ˆ( ) /( )( )
ˆ( ) /( )
N
i i i i
i ji ji
j i j j j j
e e s yE LIR LBR r
e e s y≠
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤−⎪= − ⎢⎨
−⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
∑ ⎪⎥⎬ .      (7) 
The scalar 0  denotes country i’s non-export income share. The scalar  






i is y  indicate, respectively, country i’s assessment of country j’s 
ability and inclination to reward country i’s commitment to per capita domestic 
emission-reduction with more favorable economic and political relations. A negative 
(positive)  reflects country i’s overall expectation to be rewarded (sanctioned) 
for her relatively strong (weak) commitment to emission abatement with more (less) 
favorable international economic and political relations. 
     In view of the said costs and expected benefits, country i’s expected net benefit 
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5. Cooperative emission abatement 
The cooperatively optimal abatement of per capita emissions by country i is 
. If , 
 is concave in  and there exists an interior solution for which the 
marginal expected global benefit from country i’s optimal per capita emission 
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   (9) 
Though not a closed-form solution, it is useful, for a comparison with the non-
cooperative emission abatement, to express country i’s cooperatively optimal per 
capita emission abatement as:  
2
2
ˆ[( ) /( )]( )
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PROPOSITION 2. In a cooperatively optimal scheme country i reduces, maintains, or 
increases its emissions if 
[( ) /( )]
( ) ( )
ˆ( )
N N
ji j j i i
i i ij j i o
j i j i j j
r s y s y
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e e
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)ˆ(
1










Proof: Since the denominator of the term on the right hand side of (10) is positive the 
sign of  is equal to the sign of the numerator.■  oii ee −ˆ
 
     Proposition 2 says that the larger the ability ( ) and inclination ( ) of 
country i to economically and politically reward other countries, the smaller her 
cooperatively optimal per capita emission abatement. Moreover, with sufficiently 
large such ability and inclination, country i’s per capita emissions increase when an 
international scheme that maximizes the sum of the member countries’ expected net 
benefits is implemented. Equation (10) also indicates that country i’s cooperatively 
optimal abatement rises with her own and counterparts’ marginal benefits from 
improved domestic residential environments and moderated global warming and with 
her improved international relations, but diminishes with the erosion of her 
counterparts’ relative abatement and subsequent bilateral relations with her. Country 
ijr ( ) /( )i i j js y s y
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i’s cooperatively optimal abatement also decreases with the gradient of her marginal 
mitigation and adaptation costs.  
 
6. Unilateral emission abatement      
In the absence of an international agreement, a rationally managed country 
unilaterally abates greenhouse gas emissions at a level that maximizes her expected 
net benefit per se. In this unilateral framework, the country ignores the effect of her 
emission abatement on other countries’ environment and loss of international 
relations. As  is concave in iENB ˆ( i ie e )− , there exists an interior 
. It equates country i’s marginal expected self benefit from 
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Consequently, the unilateral expected net benefit maximizing abatement of per capita 
emissions is equal to the ratio of the sum of country i’s marginal benefits from 
improved international relations and domestic residential environment and moderated 
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.                (12) 
By ignoring the effects of her emissions on any other country’s residential 
environment (trans-boundary pollution) and suffering from global warming, country i 
understates the benefits stemming from her emission abatement. Furthermore, by 
ignoring the effect of her abatement on any other country’s loss of bilateral relations 
with her, country i understates other countries’ incentives to reduce emissions. This 
latter argument can explain the counterintuitive outcome indicated in Proposition 3 of 
a unilateral emission abatement by country i which is larger than her allotted 
abatement had the aforementioned internationally cooperative scheme (that 
maximizes the sum of the member countries’ expected net benefits) been 
implemented. As indicated in the previous section, a country i with high ability ( ) 
and inclination ( ) to economically and politically reward other countries 
ijr
( ) /( )i i j js y s y
1,2,3,...,j i≠ = N  might be awarded with a relatively low per capita emission 
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abatement. Large, open, lower and upper middle income economies might have such 
ability and inclination.  Furthermore, a powerful country i  (one that can inflict a large 
loss of bilateral relations –  – on some other countries j) that strongly 
evaluates her own benefit from improved global environment (has a large 
max
ijLBR
iγ ), might 
coerce weaker countries into abating greater quantities of emissions than the 
cooperatively optimal ones by adhering to a punitive policy (low ). The possibility 
that for some countries the cooperative expected net benefit maximizing abatement of 
per capita emissions is smaller than the unilateral expected net benefit maximizing 
abatement is indicated in the following proposition. 
ijr
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Proof: By comparing the numerators of equations (10) and (12). ■   
 
7. Cournot equilibrium levels of abatement 
If each country’s expectations about the other countries’ abatement levels are perfect 
( ), the solution of the N equation-system (12) is the Cournot equilibrium of 
the N countries’ emission-abatement levels. In order to shed light on the properties of 
the Cournot equilibrium levels of abatement let us consider the analytically tractable 
case of a world divided into two alliances (e.g., an alliance of low and middle income 
countries producing tradable primary and manufactured goods versus the rest of the 
world). In this case, the expected-net-benefit maximizing per capita emissions are 
*exp
jj ee =


















= −                   (13) 
for alliance 1, and by symmetry, 
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12 1 1 2 2














               (14) 
for alliance 2. As shown in Appendix B, the solution to this system of reaction 
equations yields the following Cournot equilibrium per capita emission abatement for 
alliance 1: 
2 2
* 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 21 2 1 1 2 1 12 1 1 2 2 1
1 1 2
1 2 2 2 1
22 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 21 2 2 1 1 2 1 12 1 1 2 2 1
2
1 2 2 2 1
[0.5( )( ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ]ˆ 0.5
( / )( )
0.5( )( ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )0.5
( / )( )
sPP c y r s y s y P c y r s y s y Pe e
c y P P
PP c y r s y s y P c y r s y s y P
c y P P
α γ α γ
α γ
α γ α γ
α γ
+ + + −
− =
+




1 1 1 12 1 1 2 2
2
1 2 2 2 1
( ) ( / )2
( / )( )
Pr s y s y







    (15) 
The quantity and properties of  are obtained by symmetry.  *2 2ˆ(e e− )
)
     Equation (15) reveals that in the Cournot equilibrium, the per capita emission 
abated by alliance 1  rises with the marginal improvement in its own 
environment stemming from its own abatement (
*
1 1ˆ(e e−
1α ), with its marginal benefit from 
the combined effort of curbing global warming ( 1γ ), with alliance 2’s ability to 
reward commitment, weighted by its relative non-export per capita income 
( ), and with alliance 2’s marginal mitigation and adaptation costs’ 
gradient ( ). In the Cournot equilibrium, alliance 1’s per capita emission 
abatement declines with its own marginal mitigation and adaptation costs’ gradient 
( ) and with the size of its own population ( ). In order to assess the effect 
of alliance 1’s ability to reward alliance 2 and the effect of alliance 2’s population size 
on alliance 1’s emission-abatement level in a Cournot equilibrium it is important to 
note that 
21 2 2 1 1( /r s y s y
2c c=
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where  is the discriminant indicated in the second term on the right-hand side of 




1 1[1 2( /(( / ) )] 0c y Pα γ− + >
1 1 2 2( /s y s y
. In which case the per capita emissions abated by 
alliance 1 in a Cournot equilibrium rise with the population of alliance 2 and decline 
with alliance 1’s ability to reward alliance 2 ( ). The emission-abatement 
moderating effect of the latter factor is increased by alliance 1’s relative non-export 
per capita income . Recalling that 
12r
*
1 1 ) /) 21[(r 2 2 1 1ˆ( { ) /( )]} 0e e s y s y∂ − ∂ >
1 1 2 2( /s y s y
, the 
total effect of alliance 1’s relative non-export per capita income  on 
alliance 1’s emission reduction is negative.  
)
 
8. Conclusion    
The use of per capita figures in our comparison of internationally cooperative and 
unilateral greenhouse gas emission abatements was motivated by the outcomes of our 
preliminary investigation of the international carbon-dioxide emission inequality and 
by the inequitability of an internationally uniform abatement rate of countries’ 
aggregate emissions. Using a decomposable inequality indicator that takes into 
account population shares, our investigation revealed a stable dominance of the 
emission inequality between five income groups of countries over the inequality 
within these groups during the post Cold War and transition period to global market 
economy. As the populations of poor countries grow in a higher rate than the 
populations of rich countries, it is expected that the emission inequality between the 
income groups of countries will be aggravated by an internationally uniform 
abatement rate. Consequently, a country’s costs and benefits of abatement were 
formulated in a manner that highlights the effects of the country’s and her 
counterparts’ per capita emissions, incomes and domestically consumed output. As 
countries’ environment and terms of trade depend on the commitment of each other to 
emission reduction, there are international benefits to a country from impressing her 
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counterparts of being environmentally responsible and non-opportunistic trading 
partner. Per capita output and its traded component were assumed to influence the 
assessment of, and reaction to, a country’s commitment to emission abatement by 
other countries. This influence was incorporated into the determination of a country’s 
internationally cooperative and unilateral emission abatements. The analysis revealed 
that under such an influence the unilateral emission abatement might exceed the 
internationally cooperative abatement not only in the case of a weak country, but also 
in the case of a large, open, lower, or upper, middle income economy that has high 
ability and inclination to reward other countries with improved bilateral economic and 
political relations. 
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Appendix A: Income Groups  
(Based on World Bank list of economies, July 2009) 
 
Low Income: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Haiti, Kenya, Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 
Lower Middle Income: Albania, Angola, Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, 
Jordan, Kiribati, Liberia, Maldives, Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Vanuatu 
 
Upper Middle Income: Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Palau, 
Panama, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Suriname, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
 
Higher Income–nonOECD: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Cayman Islands, China-Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, China-Macao Special Administrative Region, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, French 
Guiana, French Polynesia, Greenland, Hungary, Israel, Kuwait, Malta, Netherlands 
Antilles, New Caledonia, Oman, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates 
 
Higher Income-OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea (Republic of), 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
 18
Appendix B: The Cournot equilibrium 
Recall (13), (14) and (4),  
21 2 2 1 1
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and 
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.               (B2) 
Let 1 1 1θ α γ≡ + , 2 2 2θ α γ≡ + , 1 1 1y s y=  and 2 2 2y s y=  and substitute the right hand 
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In turn, 
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By rearranging terms, 
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Consequently, 
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The roots of (A6) are: 
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                             (B7) 
As the discriminant in (B7) is positive and larger than the absolute value of the 
coefficient of  in (B6), only the following root is considered to be relevant: *1 1ˆ(e e− )
2 2
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